

The veto as electoral stunt

EITM and a test with comparative data

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A **Form:** see EITM in action

- 1 formal model
- 2 comparative statics
- 3 falsifiable implications
- 4 test


B **Substance:** Why vetoes?

- 1 Caused by **position taking** (cf. Groseclose&McCarty 2001), not uncertainty (cf. Cameron 2000)
- 2 Veto overrides enter the analysis, branch symmetry
- 3 Comparative research design

Minor tweak to a standard model

Agenda setter model applied to exec.–leg. relations
(Romer&Rosenthal 1978, Kiewiet&McCubbins 1988)

Add propensity $0 \leq \pi \leq 1$ to take positions




$$\pi = 0$$

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


$$\pi = 0$$

Minor tweak to a standard model


Agenda setter model applied to exec.–leg. relations
(Romer&Rosenthal 1978, Kiewiet&McCubbins 1988)

Add propensity $0 \leq \pi \leq 1$ to take positions



$$\pi = 1$$

Dual motivation




$$\begin{aligned}u_i(\omega | a) &= (1 - \pi) \text{PolicyGain}_i(\omega) + \pi \text{Position}_i(a) \\ &= (1 - \pi) (\text{Policy}_i(\omega) - \text{Policy}_i(x_0)) + \pi \text{Position}_i(a)\end{aligned}$$

if $\pi = 0$:

$$u_i(\omega) = \text{PolicyGain}_i(\omega)$$

Dual motivation



$$\begin{aligned}u_i(\omega | a) &= (1 - \pi) \text{PolicyGain}_i(\omega) + \pi \text{Position}_i(a) \\ &= (1 - \pi) (\text{Policy}_i(\omega) - \text{Policy}_i(x_0)) + \pi \text{Position}_i(a)\end{aligned}$$

if $\pi = 0$:


$$u_i(\omega) = \text{PolicyGain}_i(\omega)$$

Small- π constraint removes conflict between PolicyGain and Position

Equilibrium of the stunts game


$$\begin{aligned}
 x^* &= \begin{cases} l & \text{if } x_0 < l \text{ or } \min(e_0, v_0) \leq l \\ & \text{or } \{l < x_0 < \min(e_0, v_0) \text{ \& } 0 < \pi < \tau\} \\ & \text{or } \tau < \pi \leq 1 \\ \min(e_0, v_0) + \epsilon & \text{if } l < \min(e_0, v_0) \leq x_0 \text{ \& } 0 \leq \pi < \tau \\ x_0 & \text{if } l < x_0 < \min(e_0, v_0) \text{ \& } \pi = 0 \end{cases} \\
 y^*(x) &= \begin{cases} \text{accept} & \text{if } x \in \wp_v \text{ \& } \pi = 0 \\ & \text{or } x \in \wp_e \text{ \& } \pi \neq 0 \\ \text{veto} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 z^*(x) &= \begin{cases} \text{override} & \text{if } x \in \wp_v \\ \text{sustain} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 \tau^*(x) &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } l \leq e \leq v \text{ \& } \{l < x_0 \leq v \text{ or } 2v - l \leq x_0 \leq 2e - l\} \\ & \text{or } l \leq x_0 \leq e \leq v \\ \frac{2|e-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} & \text{if } l \leq e \leq v \text{ \& } e \leq x_0 \leq 2e - l \\ \frac{2|v-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} & \text{if } l < v < e \text{ \& } v \leq x_0 \leq 2v - l \\ 1 & \text{if } v \leq l \leq e \text{ or } x_0 \leq l \text{ or } 2e - l \leq x_0. \end{cases}
 \end{aligned}$$

When to expect stunts




A tiny drop of position-taking leaves setter model's outcomes unchanged, but accounts for vetoes and overrides


Letting x_0 vary




$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 x^* = & l & l \\
 \omega^* = & l & x_0 \\
 \tau^* = & 1 & 0
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{rcl}
 & e_0 + \epsilon & l \\
 & e_0 + \epsilon & l \\
 & \frac{2|e-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} & 1
 \end{array}$$



Letting x_0 vary




$$\begin{array}{rcl}
 x^* & = & l \qquad \qquad \qquad l \qquad \qquad \qquad e_0 + \epsilon \qquad \qquad \qquad l \\
 \omega^* & = & l \qquad \qquad \qquad x_0 \qquad \qquad \qquad e_0 + \epsilon \qquad \qquad \qquad l \\
 \tau^* & = & 1 \qquad \qquad \qquad 0 \qquad \qquad \qquad \frac{2|e-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} \qquad \qquad \qquad 1
 \end{array}$$



Comparative statics

$$\begin{array}{l}
 x^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \omega^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \tau^* = \quad \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad 1
 \end{array}$$


I: $v \leq l \leq e$



 **sustained veto**
(assembly stunt)

$$\begin{array}{l}
 x^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad v_0 + \epsilon \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \omega^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad x_0 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad v_0 + \epsilon \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \tau^* = \quad \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad \quad 0 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \frac{2|v-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} \quad \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad \quad 1
 \end{array}$$


II: $l < v < e$



 **override**
(executive stunt)

$$\begin{array}{l}
 x^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad e_0 + \epsilon \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \omega^* = \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad x_0 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad e_0 + \epsilon \quad \quad \quad / \quad \quad \quad / \\
 \tau^* = \quad \quad \quad 1 \quad \quad \quad 0 \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \frac{2|e-x_0|-\epsilon}{|x_0-l|} \quad \quad \quad 1
 \end{array}$$

III: $l \leq e \leq v$



 **no veto**

If $\|l, e\| = f(\text{div.gov})$ and $\|l, v\| = f(\text{maj.above.override})$
testable hypotheses follow

Veto probability/incidence:


$$\frac{\delta \text{pr. veto}}{\delta l} < 0; \frac{\delta \text{pr. veto}}{\delta e} > 0; \text{ and } \frac{\delta \text{pr. veto}}{\delta v} \leq 0.$$

Override probability/incidence:

$$\frac{\delta \text{pr. ovr}}{\delta l} \leq 0; \frac{\delta \text{pr. ovr}}{\delta e} \geq 0; \text{ and } \frac{\delta \text{pr. ovr}}{\delta v} \leq 0.$$

(Inequalities reverse when $l > e$).


Veto institutions in state governments



Comparative data needed to test

Status	Share required to override a veto			All sessions
	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{2}{3}$	
Div. Govt. above override	32	6	5	8
Div. Govt. below override	—	17	34	28
Div. Assembly	5	38	19	19
Unif. Govt. below override	—	5	23	19
Unif. Govt. above override	63	34	19	26
Total	100	100	100	100
<i>N</i>	170	128	1,067	1,365

Veto incidence in states' legislative sessions 1979–99



mean = 16, sd = 40 vetoes

Four models of veto counts in state legislative sessions

Variable	MODEL 1			MODEL 2			MODEL 3			MODEL 4		
	parameter estimate ^a (robust std. error in parentheses) ^b	p-value ^c		parameter estimate ^a (robust std. error in parentheses) ^b	p-value ^c		parameter estimate ^a (robust std. error in parentheses) ^b	p-value ^c		parameter estimate ^a (robust std. error in parentheses) ^b	p-value ^c	
Constant	-2.79 (.28)	<.001		-3.17 (.49)	<.001		-3.38 (.46)	<.001		-3.53 (.22)	<.001	
<i>PlainDG</i>	.61 (.13)	<.001		.54 (.12)	<.001		.53 (.11)	<.001		.75 (.08)	<.001	
<i>SuperDG</i>	.31 (.13)	.02		.36 (.13)	.01		.53 (.13)	<.001		.95 (.12)	<.001	
<i>DividedAssembly</i>	.08 (.11)	.51		.05 (.11)	.69		.02 (.11)	.89		.19 (.10)	.05	
$\ln(\text{Elect. Proximity})$.08 (.03)	.02		.07 (.03)	.03		.03 (.03)	.29		.03 (.02)	.11	
$\ln(\text{BillsPassed})$	1.00 (.03)	<.001		.97 (.06)	<.001		.97 (.05)	<.001		.92 (.03)	<.001	
<i>ItemVeto</i>	—	—		.72 (.15)	<.001		.44 (.15)	.003		—	—	
<i>PocketVeto</i>	—	—		-.23 (.09)	.02		-.15 (.08)	.08		—	—	
<i>SpecialSession</i>	—	—		-.12 (.25)	.62		-.06 (.23)	.81		—	—	
<i>ProfessionalAssembly</i>	—	—		—	—		.58 (.09)	<.001		—	—	
<i>EconomyGrew</i>	—	—		—	—		-.11 (.11)	.30		—	—	
State fixed effects	—	—		—	—		—	—		(not reported)	—	
Wald test of nil paramet.:	1,108	<.001		1,084	<.001		1,124	<.001		4,797	<.001	
LR test that $\alpha = 0$:	2.0×10^4	<.001		1.9×10^4	<.001		1.5×10^4	<.001		5.5×10^3	<.001	
Log likelihood =	-3,723			-3,699			-3,670			-3,347		
<i>N</i> =	1,365			1,365			1,365			1,365		

Notes: (a) Negative binomial method of estimation. (b) Huber 1967; White 1980. (c) Two-tailed tests.

Coefficient for:


super.dg

plain.dg

div.assembly

super.ug

ln(election.proximity)



Model, hypotheses, and test summary

$$\ln(\overline{\text{veto.count}}_j) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{super.dg}_j + \beta_2 \text{plain.dg}_j + \beta_3 \text{div.assembly}_j + \beta_4 \text{super.ug}_j + \beta_5 \ln(\text{election.proximity}_j) + \dots + \text{error}_j$$

Hypothesis	Coef.	Prediction	Test	
			result	level ^a
Divided government surge	β_2	+	+	<.001
Supermajority thrust	β_1	+	+	.001
	β_4	+	+	.067
	β_1 & β_4^b	+	+	.003
Size and status	$\beta_1 - \beta_4^b$	+	+	.012
Electoral pulse	β_5	+	+	.001

(a) One-tailed test. (b) Wald test.



Model, hypotheses, and test summary

$$\ln(\overline{\text{veto.count}}_j) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{super.dg}_j + \beta_2 \text{plain.dg}_j + \beta_3 \text{div.assembly}_j + \beta_4 \text{super.ug}_j + \beta_5 \ln(\text{election.proximity}_j) + \dots + \text{error}_j$$

Hypothesis	Coef.	Prediction	Test		Uncertainty prediction
			result	level ^a	
Divided government surge	β_2	+	+	<.001	+
Supermajority thrust	β_1	+	+	.001	-
	β_4	+	+	.067	-
	β_1 & β_4^b	+	+	.003	-
Size and status	$\beta_1 - \beta_4^b$	+	+	.012	?
Electoral pulse	β_5	+	+	.001	-

(a) One-tailed test. (b) Wald test.

Govt status



Next steps:

- ① TSCS: Beck&Katz (1995) extends to negbin regression?
- ② Go hierarchical, model overdispersion at state-level
- ③ Try Richman's (2011) status quo direct test

Food for thought (forum?):

- ④ Publication: EITM too much for one paper?
- ⑤ Fence-sitting?

Comments/critiques very welcome
Thank you!

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