

# Resources, Enforcement, and Party Discipline under Candidate-Centered PR

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We should not expect both these conditions to be often simultaneously present in established party systems

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- This has observable implications for MP loyalty and party unity
- We will also show that party organization can critically limit the extent to which electoral systems can have an effect on legislative behavior



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*“Normally, disobedience would result in having one’s name removed from the list; among the 15, there were about 7 who were so-called ‘steam engines’ and removing them would result in losing considerable votes” (Wenderlich, interview 2011)*

## A Backbencher's perspective


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
*"In a vote to appoint constitutional court justices, the party urged its members to vote against my law school advisor. I asked the caucus whip for an exemption. It was denied even though it would not have changed the final outcome."* (Karpinski, interview 2010)

## Sequence, Players and Strategies




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
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
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
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# Comparative Statics: Backbenchers and Steam Engines

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
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
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
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- The threat of enforcement is not credible when  $b_V \geq (\leq) \frac{x}{2} + (-) \frac{r+d\pi}{2x}$  (for extreme preferences, backbenchers follow constituencies and get disciplined)
- In equilibrium, Steam Engines are never disciplined

## Hypothesis for MP Variation in Loyalty

Across MPs: Observed party loyalty should be lower for MPs with the largest vote shares on the party list but this should be *conditional on how far their preferences diverge from that of the leadership*

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
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





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- Tobit model with party random intercepts
- Variables: interaction between *vote share* and *outside cosponsorship*, dummies for each term, control for party PM status

# Conditional Effect of Vote Share on Party Loyalty



# Government Status and Party Unity Over Time



# Conclusions

- Disloyalty should occur only when two conditions are in place
  - ① The leader cannot enforce discipline due to:
    - ① MP clout: contributes decisively to the party's goals
    - ② Lack of resources (govt status)
  - ② The MP's preferences diverge from that of the party leader's
- These conditions are less likely to occur in institutionalized party systems due to the structure of recruitment, the strength of party reputations, and the stability of party support bases.
- Party organizations mediate the effect of electoral systems and explain much of the variation in party loyalty/unity in nascent democracies

## Tobit Regression: Party Loyalty Across MPs

	(1) All	(2) All	(3) First Excluded
Vote Share	-0.884*** (0.333)	-4.108*** (0.692)	-7.733*** (1.669)
Outside Cosponsorship		0.773*** (0.086)	0.994*** (0.118)
Vote Share X Outside Cosponsorship		-1.479*** (0.260)	-2.925*** (0.641)
PM Party	2.857** (1.110)	3.160*** (1.125)	3.437*** (0.985)
First	-0.0723 (0.115)	-0.037 (0.128)	
2001	1.577 (1.239)	1.470 (1.250)	1.797 (1.107)
2005	1.977 (1.297)	2.606** (1.329)	2.905** (1.173)
2007	0.976 (1.275)	1.419 (1.303)	1.722 (1.186)
Constant	94.66*** (1.058)	95.842*** (1.078)	95.97*** (0.970)
Observations	2,065	1,741	1,128
Number of pid	28	26	25

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

