


Women Don't Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry

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EITM American Panel
MPSA Conference
April 12, 2013

Descriptive under-representation



Diversity and quality of representation

- ▶ Legitimacy (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005)
- ▶ Issue attention (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Swers 1998)
- ▶ Decision-making (Kanthak and Krause 2011, Page 2007, Wooley et al 2010)
- ▶ Negotiating (Babcock and Laschever 2003, Kimmel et al 1980, Walters et al 1998)

Potential sources of election aversion

- ▶ Believe capable of representing?
- ▶ Willing to run in an election and convince others?

Overview of experiments

					The Sum
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Click the button to submit your sum					
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- ▶ Lab analogue of policy-making ability: Addition Task (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007)
- ▶ Common incentives for selecting the best representative
- ▶ Vary selection mechanism (electoral vs non-electoral)

Experiment 1 procedures

- ▶ Part I. Piece rate
 - ▶ Addition Task
 - ▶ \$0.75 per correct sum
 - ▶ Feedback only about individual score

Experiment 1 procedures

- ▶ Part II. Group representation
 - ▶ Choose to volunteer
 - ▶ Representative randomly selected from volunteers
 - ▶ Repeat addition task
 - ▶ \$0.50 per rep. sum, \$0.25 per own sum


Experiment 1 procedures

- ▶ Part III. Election
 - ▶ Choose to run as candidate
 - ▶ Candidates simultaneously send campaign text messages
 - ▶ Election by plurality rule, random tie-breaker
 - ▶ Earn \$1 per vote, \$2 cost of running
 - ▶ Repeat addition task
 - ▶ \$0.50 per rep. sum, \$0.25 per own sum


Theoretical expectations

- ▶ Volunteering depends on beliefs about **relative policy ability**
 - ▶ Run if own ability above the average of other volunteers
 - ▶ Risk aversion \Rightarrow More likely to volunteer
- ▶ Running for office depends on beliefs about **relative policy ability** and beliefs about the **likelihood of winning**
 - ▶ Number of other candidates
 - ▶ Informativeness of campaign environment
 - ▶ Voter responses to messages


Task performance



Choice results



Choice results



Overview of Experiment 2

		Campaign	
		Chat	Truth
Costs and benefits of entry	With	<i>CCB</i>	<i>TCB</i>
	Without	<i>CNO</i>	<i>TNO</i>

Part 1 Piece rate


Part 2 Volunteer

Part 3 Election


Part 4 Estimation (belief elicitation)

Part 5 Lottery choice (risk preference)


Volunteer choices




Candidate choices




Candidate choices




Candidate choices




Candidate choices



Beliefs about others



Risk preferences



Probit regression

	Men	Women
Score	0.34** (0.07)	0.24** (0.11)
Safe Choices	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.07)
Number Willing	0.17* (0.10)	0.61** (0.12)
Average Willing	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.19** (0.05)

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Model includes treatment indicators and interactions with Score

Summary

- ▶ Strong election aversion among women, but not men
- ▶ Not explained by differences in ability, risk aversion, or beliefs
- ▶ Only mitigated by combination of truthful campaigns and eliminating costs of entry and benefits of office