# EITM: International Relations

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# EITM

- "What do these papers tell us about how EITM has made a difference - or should make a difference in the future"

- 2 components
- **EI** = Empirical implications (derive testable hypotheses/claims)
  Distinguish between theories; models
  Research design and causal inference; variety in approaches (qualitative, quantitative)

- **TM**= Logically describe/model how independent factors affect outcome variables
  Puts structure on the problem, abstraction, parsimony, internal consistency

# EITM: Sources of domestic conflict (Bapat and Lacina)

- Question(s): Conditions/rationales for in and out-group violence?

- **Theoretical model (TM)**
- 3 actor formal model: Government/Center, Local faction/In-group, Terrorist/Out-group
- Objective function: Degree of "autonomy" granted by G to L/In-group
- Differences: Sequential, G-L-T (Bapat), Periphery groups move simultaneously and G moves first (Lacina)

- **Empirical implications (EI)**
- Use model to derive comparative statics:
- Military occupation continues if T remains moderately powerful (because L demands protection from G)
- Highest probability of separatism is when a group's rival in the periphery is moderately politically favored

- Strength: Recognize data limitations
- Often difficult to observe and measure terrorist threat over time (esp. in large N) $\Rightarrow$ Case studies (Bapat)
- Level of aggregation of conflict often poses problems $\Rightarrow$ 3 levels of analysis (Lacina)

- Clear exposition: Table linking cases with predictions (Bapat); main patterns evident in "raw data" (Lacina)

- Competing effects: Rival explanations exist and their effects are contrasted with the author's hypothesized effects (e.g., Vuong test in Lacina)

# Potential theoretical extensions

- Omits international relations:
- These conflicts occur in an international environment, where foreign governments/actors may influence domestic groups (L,T; S,M)
- e.g., diaspora finances rebelion; rival power funds rebel group (Afghanistan), national prestige
- Has implications for empirical tests of model (discussed by Lacina)

- Omits political institutions:
- Power sharing arrangements affect political violence (Besley and Persson 2010, 2011)
- Alternate policy: G or Center's capacity to change institutions may mediate domestic conflict

# Some concerns

- **Bapat**
- Assumption: If L asks G to leave it does. Seems unlikely with US in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Implication: If moderate terrorism permits G to remain in a territory, it might be optimal for G to under provide security? For example, G may have an additional motive - e.g., to balance against a rival, project military power in to other regions
- India: Regardless of level of terrorism, is there any scenario where G ceases to "occupy" in Kashmir?
- Extension: Model can be extended to explain colonial strategies

- **Lacina**
- Estimation: Rare-event logits? Incidence of separatist conflict is quite low
- Past conflict: Does incidence/duration/outcome of past separatist conflict matter? Include as a control
- Endogeneity: Measure of ethnic groups/differentiation are often endogenous with separatist desires. The desire to be autonomous may motivate individuals to identify with a particular ethnicity or group characteristic