

Periphery versus periphery

The origins of separatist war

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Separatism: Center versus periphery?


- ▶ Controversy over resource extraction
- ▶ Resentment at unequal development




Government political ties to rival groups in periphery

- ▶ Ethnic groups most likely to become violent separatists if rivals in the periphery are moderately politically advantaged at the capital
- ▶ True net of ethnic group inclusion in central power and regional autonomy
- ▶ More empirically powerful explanation of separatism that center/periphery economic or resource disparities


Center indifferent, seeks compromise



Government stalls concessions, concedes after violence




Deterred by likely government repression



Empirical strategy 1: Panel analysis of separatist insurgencies

- ▶ 2 empirical strategies, talk about most general
- ▶ Unit of analysis: Ethnic groups, 1950–2009 (EPR)
- ▶ DV: Onset of separatist war (UCDP/PRIO)
- ▶ Rival group has largest area of overlap (GeoEPR)
- ▶ Key IV: Rival group's relative political standing, coded using EPR access to central power categorization:



Potential confounds

Group's political grievances

- ▶ Group excluded from power
- ▶ Regional autonomy
- ▶ Regime type

Determinants of political position

- ▶ Group population
- ▶ $(\text{Group's population share} - \text{rival's population share})^2$
- ▶ Distance to capital

Country-level GDP per capita, population, peace years and peace year splines

Factor change in odds of separatist war onset

Rival equal	7.0 ⁺
Rival advantaged	10 [*]
Rival dominant	5.6

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Other specifications control for number of separatists in country; coethnics abroad; coethnics in power abroad; coethnic rebellion abroad; center/periphery distributional conflict.

Explanatory power cf. center/periphery distributional conflict

Center/periphery model includes:

Inequality		X	
Relative deprivation			X
Relative wealth			X
Relative oil/gas wealth			X
Ln likelihood center/periphery model	-794	-791	-792
Ln likelihood periphery/periphery model	-768	-768	-768
Vuong statistic	2.48	2.53	2.30
<i>p-value</i>	0.013	0.011	0.022

Conclusions

- ▶ Account of separatism focused on conflicting interests in the periphery
- ▶ Use three empirical strategies to exploit unique strengths different types of data
- ▶ Results suggest literature mischaracterizes what is at stake in separatist wars

Political standing of an ethnic group's main rival in the periphery and the onset of separatist war, 1946–2009

	Separatist war			
	Yes		No	
	N	%	N	%
Rival dominant	33	0.64	5085	99
Rival advantaged	33	0.94	3463	99
Rival equal	69	0.58	11781	99
Rival disadvantaged	2	0.031	6377	100
Total	137	0.51	26706	99
χ^2	44.80			
<i>p-value</i>	0.000			

Inequality measures

If g is the per capita GDP of the ethnic group's area and G that of the country:

$$\text{Inequality} = (\log(g/G))^2$$

Model 2 controls for inequality while Model 3 distinguishes between relatively deprived and relatively wealthy areas:

$$\text{Relative deprivation} = \begin{cases} g/G & \text{if } g < G \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Relative wealth} = \begin{cases} G/g & \text{if } G < g \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Separatist war onset	0.0047	0.068	0	1
Rival dominant	0.21	0.41	0	1
Rival advantaged	0.14	0.34	0	1
Rival equal	0.41	0.49	0	1
Inequality	0.12	0.39	0	5.1
Relative deprivation	0.78	0.74	0	6.0
Relative wealth	0.52	0.82	0	9.6
Relative oil/gas wealth	0.079	0.27	0	1
Group excluded at center	0.56	0.50	0	1
Regional autonomy	0.11	0.31	0	1
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.19	0.28	0	0.95
Ln distance to capital	5.9	1.2	1.2	8.6
Anocracy	0.25	0.44	0	1
Democracy	0.31	0.46	0	1
Ln group population ('000s)	9.5	2.0	2.0	16
Ln country GDP per capita	7.8	1.2	2.7	11
Ln country population ('000s)	17	2.0	12	21
Peace years	28	18	0	63
Observations	21470			

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Rival dominant	5.6 (6.1)	5.5 (6.1)	5.6 (6.1)
Rival advantaged	10* (12)	7.4+ (8.1)	8.0+ (8.7)
Rival equal	7.0+ (7.6)	5.4 (5.7)	5.4 (5.7)
Inequality		1.3 (0.32)	
Relative deprivation			1.3 (0.32)
Relative wealth			1.1 (0.13)
Relative oil/gas wealth		2.1+ (0.95)	2.2+ (0.95)
Group excluded at center	4.5*** (1.9)	4.6*** (1.9)	4.5*** (1.9)
Regional autonomy	2.9** (1.1)	3.2** (1.2)	3.2** (1.2)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.64 (0.56)	0.72 (0.54)	0.71 (0.53)
Ln distance to capital	1.3 (0.26)	1.3 (0.24)	1.2 (0.25)
Anocracy	2.2* (0.89)	2.1+ (0.90)	2.1 (0.95)
Democracy	1.9 (0.89)	2.1 (1.1)	2.0 (1.0)
Ln group population (‘000s)	1.1 (0.088)	1.00 (0.079)	1.0 (0.081)
Ln country GDP per capita	1.2 (0.18)	1.1 (0.19)	1.1 (0.19)
Ln country population (‘000s)	1.1 (0.17)	1.1 (0.17)	1.1 (0.17)
Peace year splines	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21470	18862	18862
Ln likelihood	-557	-520	-520

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by country

* $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Periphery vs periphery model	Center vs periphery models		
Rival dominant	17*** (10)			
Rival advantaged	19*** (11)			
Rival equal	11*** (6.5)			
Inequality		1.4** (0.17)		
Relative deprivation			1.4*** (0.13)	
Relative wealth			1.1 (0.13)	
Relative oil/gas wealth				2.1** (0.49)
Observations	23766	23766	23766	23766
Ln likelihood	-768	-794	-791	-792
Vuong statistic		2.48	2.53	2.30
<i>p-value</i>		0.013	0.011	0.022

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Model ?21	Model ?22	Model ?23
Rival dominant	5.8 (6.3)	5.7 (6.2)	5.8 (6.4)
Rival advantaged	8.9* (9.8)	8.7+ (9.7)	7.8+ (8.6)
Rival equal	6.7+ (7.1)	6.6+ (7.0)	6.3+ (6.7)
Group excluded at center	4.2*** (1.8)	4.1** (1.7)	4.1** (1.8)
Regional autonomy	2.8** (1.0)	3.0** (1.1)	3.1** (1.2)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.46 (0.40)	0.45 (0.40)	0.42 (0.37)
Ln distance to capital	1.3 (0.25)	1.3 (0.25)	1.3 (0.25)
Anocracy	1.9+ (0.64)	1.9+ (0.61)	1.8+ (0.58)
Democracy	1.2 (0.62)	1.2 (0.62)	1.3 (0.63)
Ln group population ('000s)	0.97 (0.073)	0.97 (0.078)	0.95 (0.072)
Ln country GDP per capita	1.1 (0.16)	1.1 (0.15)	1.1 (0.15)
Ln country population ('000s)	1.4* (0.21)	1.4+ (0.22)	1.4* (0.22)
No. potential separatists	0.95* (0.019)	0.95* (0.020)	0.95* (0.020)
Crossborder coethnics	0.84 (0.18)		
Crossborder coethnics in power		0.53 (0.27)	
Crossborder coethnic rebellion			2.0 (1.1)
Peace year splines	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21470	21470	21470
Ln likelihood	-548	-548	-548

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by country

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Model ??4	Model ??5	Model ??6	Model ??7	Model ??8	
					Separatist	Non-separatist
Rival dominant	5.7 (6.2)	5.6 (6.1)	7.5 ⁺ (8.2)	7.7 ⁺ (8.5)	5.6 (6.1)	2.1 (1.3)
Rival advantaged	8.1 ⁺ (8.9)	8.2 ⁺ (9.1)	9.0 ⁺ (10)	11* (12)	10* (12)	1.6 (1.0)
Rival equal	6.7 ⁺ (7.1)	6.8 ⁺ (7.2)	7.2 ⁺ (7.6)	7.2 ⁺ (7.6)	7.0 ⁺ (7.6)	1.9 (1.1)
Group excluded at center	4.5*** (1.8)	4.5*** (1.9)	3.7** (1.6)	3.8*** (1.5)	4.5*** (2.0)	2.6* (1.1)
Regional autonomy	3.0** (1.1)	3.0** (1.1)	3.3** (1.2)	3.0** (1.1)	2.9** (1.1)	0.89 (0.63)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.43 (0.38)	0.45 (0.39)	0.44 (0.40)	0.48 (0.42)	0.63 (0.56)	0.42 (0.30)
Ln distance to capital			1.3 (0.25)	1.2 (0.24)	1.3 (0.26)	1.2 (0.18)
Anocracy	1.8 ⁺ (0.58)	1.8 ⁺ (0.58)	1.8 ⁺ (0.55)	1.9 ⁺ (0.62)	2.2* (0.89)	1.2 (0.40)
Democracy	1.1 (0.63)	1.1 (0.63)	0.90 (0.40)	1.5 (0.74)	1.9 (0.89)	0.066* (0.072)
Ln group population ('000s)	0.93 (0.067)	0.93 (0.067)	0.98 (0.084)	0.96 (0.080)	1.1 (0.088)	1.6** (0.27)
Ln country GDP per capita	1.1 (0.16)	1.1 (0.16)	1.0 (0.15)	1.1 (0.16)	1.2 (0.18)	0.84 (0.16)
Ln country population ('000s)	1.6** (0.21)	1.6** (0.21)	1.4** (0.21)	1.5* (0.25)	1.1 (0.17)	0.50*** (0.085)
No. potential separatists	0.95* (0.019)	0.95* (0.020)	0.95*** (0.016)	0.95** (0.017)		
Ln distance to international border	0.95 (0.095)					
International border		0.99 (0.38)				
Rivals possible migrants				0.52 ⁺ (0.18)		
Peace year splines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21470	21470	18841	21470	21470	
Ln likelihood	-551	-551	-472	-546	-882	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by country

* $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Non-separatist war onset	0.0025	0.050	0	1
No. potential separatists	9.9	14	0	47
Crossborder coethnics	0.50	1.0	0	9
Crossborder coethnics in power	0.13	0.34	0	1
Crossborder coethnic rebellion	0.027	0.16	0	1
Ln distance to international border	0.50	1.4	0	6.7
International border	0.88	0.33	0	1
Rivals possible migrants	0.48	0.50	0	1
Observations	21470			

Empirical strategy 2: From groups to territories...

- ▶ Unit of analysis: Sub-national administrative units in the 1990s (Cunningham and Weidmann, *ISQ*, 2010)
- ▶ DV: Anti-state separatist violence
- ▶ 2 largest groups in unit (GREG)
- ▶ Code two groups' relative political standing (EPR)

Advantages of this empirical strategy

- ▶ Different operationalization of ethnicity
- ▶ Assume rivalry based on administrative bounds, not just spatial overlap
- ▶ More accurate data on inequality

Observable implications at the territory level

An ethnic group whose

1. Rivals disfavored: Doesn't rebel
2. Rivals highly favored: Low risk of rebellion
3. Rivals of same political status: Intermediate risk of rebellion
4. Rivals moderately favored: Most likely to rebel

1 & 2 imply high political inequality peaceful

3 & 4 imply moderate inequality more violent than equality

Relative political standing of two largest ethnic groups in a subnational administrative unit and anti-state separatist violence between 1991 and 1999

	Separatist violence			
	Yes		No	
	N	%	N	%
One group dominant	27	2.3	1157	98
One group advantaged	21	3.7	550	96
Groups equal	39	4.7	785	95
Total	87	3.4	2492	97
χ^2	9.2			
<i>p-value</i>	0.010			

Factor change in odds of anti-state separatist violence

One group advantaged	3.2*
Groups equal	2.5+

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$

Controlling for whether one or both groups excluded, regional autonomy, squared difference in groups' population shares, distance to the capital, regime type, administrative unit population, country population and GDP per capita.

Other specifications control for number of separatists in country; coethnics abroad; coethnics in power abroad; coethnic rebellion abroad; center/periphery distributional conflict.

Explanatory power cf. center/periphery distributional conflict

Center/periphery model includes:

Inequality	X		
Relative deprivation		X	
Relative wealth		X	
Relative oil abundance			X
Ln likelihood center/periphery model	-277	-277	-277
Ln likelihood periphery/periphery model	-264	-264	-264
Vuong statistic	1.97	2.78	1.96
<i>p-value</i>	0.049	0.005	0.049

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
One group advantaged	3.2* (1.8)	5.2** (3.2)	5.2** (3.2)
Groups equal	2.5+ (1.4)	4.0* (2.3)	4.1* (2.4)
Inequality		1.4 (0.89)	
Relative deprivation			1.1 (0.59)
Relative wealth			1.1 (0.40)
Relative oil abundance		2.1 (0.98)	2.1 (0.98)
One or both excluded	2.7 (1.8)	4.5+ (3.5)	4.5+ (3.5)
Regional autonomy	0.48 (0.31)	1.7 (0.95)	1.6 (0.96)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.32* (0.16)	0.44 (0.24)	0.43 (0.23)
Ln distance to capital	1.3* (0.16)	1.4* (0.24)	1.4* (0.25)
Anocracy	4.8+ (4.1)	3.8 (3.6)	3.9 (3.6)
Democracy	5.1+ (4.8)	1.7 (1.3)	1.7 (1.3)
Ln population ('000s)	1.4+ (0.28)	1.5 (0.35)	1.5 (0.36)
Ln country GDP per capita	0.26* (0.18)	0.072** (0.065)	0.075** (0.065)
Ln country population ('000s)	1.5* (0.27)	1.5+ (0.32)	1.5+ (0.33)
Observations	2366	1608	1608
Ln likelihood	-268	-178	-178

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by country

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Periphery vs periphery model	Center vs periphery models		
Groups equal	4.1*** (1.2)			
One group advantaged	3.0** (0.98)			
Inequality		1.3 (0.48)		
Relative deprivation			1.1 (0.29)	
Relative wealth			1.0 (0.29)	
Relative oil abundance				1.2 (0.32)
Observations	1745	1745	1745	1745
Ln likelihood	-264	-277	-277	-277
Vuong statistic		1.97	2.78	1.96
<i>p-value</i>		0.049	0.005	0.049

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Model ?21	Model ?22	Model ?23	Model ?24	Model ?25	Model ?26
One group advantaged	3.8** (1.8)	3.8** (1.8)	5.5*** (2.7)	3.7** (1.8)	3.7** (1.8)	110* (250)
Groups equal	3.1* (1.5)	3.0* (1.5)	7.5*** (4.3)	3.3* (1.7)	3.4* (1.7)	18 (35)
One or both excluded	1.5 (0.84)	1.5 (0.77)	1.2 (0.84)	1.7 (0.89)	1.7 (0.89)	3.2 (6.1)
Regional autonomy	0.62 (0.36)	0.62 (0.36)	0.69 (0.37)	0.67 (0.38)	0.68 (0.37)	0.20* (0.14)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.23** (0.12)	0.23** (0.12)	0.25** (0.12)	0.21** (0.12)	0.21** (0.12)	0.91 (0.86)
Ln distance to capital	1.5** (0.21)	1.5** (0.21)	1.4* (0.23)			6.1*** (2.7)
Anocracy	7.0+ (7.3)	6.9+ (7.3)	4.0 (3.8)	5.7+ (5.3)	5.7+ (5.3)	
Democracy	7.7+ (8.5)	7.5+ (8.6)	3.3 (2.5)	6.7+ (7.1)	6.7+ (7.0)	
Ln population ('000s)	1.2 (0.22)	1.2 (0.22)	1.4+ (0.28)	1.1 (0.19)	1.1 (0.19)	6.0*** (2.1)
Ln country GDP per capita	0.16* (0.12)	0.16* (0.12)	0.12** (0.079)	0.17* (0.12)	0.17* (0.12)	0.015*** (0.019)
Ln country population ('000s)	2.0*** (0.44)	2.1*** (0.45)	2.0*** (0.36)	2.4*** (0.46)	2.3*** (0.46)	2.1 (1.2)
No. potential separatists	0.81** (0.062)	0.80** (0.067)	0.80*** (0.044)	0.81** (0.064)	0.81** (0.065)	
Crossborder coethnics	1.0 (0.42)					
Crossborder coethnic in power		0.90 (0.68)				
Crossborder coethnic anti-state violence			43*** (25)			
Above average population increase (%)						1.1*** (0.037)
Ln distance to international border				0.98 (0.083)		
International border					1.1 (0.37)	
Observations	2366	2366	2366	2366	2366	409
Ln likelihood	-250	-250	-202	-254	-254	-43

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by country

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-state separatist violence	0.034	0.18	0	1
Groups equal	0.32	0.47	0	1
One group advantaged	0.23	0.42	0	1
One group dominant	0.46	0.50	0	1
Inequality	0.14	0.29	8.1 e-13	3.0
Relative deprivation	0.90	0.74	0	5.1
Relative wealth	0.45	0.71	0	5.6
Relative oil abundance	0.59	0.49	0	1
One or both excluded	0.75	0.43	0	1
Regional autonomy	0.35	0.48	0	1
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.67	0.37	0	1
Ln distance to capital	5.5	1.2	0.11	8.9
Anocracy	0.35	0.48	0	1
Democracy	0.44	0.50	0	1
Ln population ('000s)	6.2	1.5	-0.18	12
Ln country GDP per capita	3.6	0.45	2.6	4.4
Ln country population ('000s)	9.7	1.5	6.6	14
Observations	2600			

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
No. potential separatists	3.9	3.9	0	18
Crossborder coethnics	0.93	0.25	0	1
Crossborder coethnic in power	0.17	0.38	0	1
Crossborder coethnic anti-state violence	0.074	0.26	0	1
Ln distance to international border	1.0	1.8	0	6.7
International border	0.74	0.44	0	1
Above average population increase (%)	4.3	7.7	0	46
Observations	2600			

Empirical strategy 3: When do Indian ethnic groups fight separatist insurgencies?

- ▶ Unit of analysis: Language groups in India's border states
- ▶ DV: Separatist civil war (UCDP/PRIO)
- ▶ Rivalrous groups identified from Indian political institutions
- ▶ IV: Linear and squared terms for relative government representation

$\frac{\text{Rival's seats}}{\text{Main group's seats}}$ in the governing party/coalition

Advantages of this empirical strategy

- ▶ Language definitions not contemporaneous with DV
- ▶ Know which groups are rivals because of incentives of formal institutions in India
- ▶ Best measurement of central government ties to particular groups
- ▶ Measures of inequality and resource wealth that change over time

Translating expectations to relative government representation


An ethnic group whose

1. Rivals disfavored: Doesn't rebel
2. Rivals highly favored: Low risk of rebellion
3. Rivals of same political status: Intermediate risk of rebellion
4. Rivals moderately favored: Most likely to rebel

Implies inverted U-curve

Maximum probability of rebellion when rival better represented in New Delhi (i.e. Relative government representation > 1)

Relative government representation and predicted probability of separatist war



Maximum probability of separatist war (90%) at relative representation equal to 1.98

Explanatory power cf. center/periphery distributional conflict

Center/periphery model includes:

Inequality	X		
Relative underdevelopment		X	
Relative development		X	
Oil region			X
Mineral region			X
Ln likelihood center/periphery model	-518	-508	-513
Ln likelihood periphery/periphery model	-494	-494	-494
Vuong statistic	3.20	1.97	2.80
<i>p-value</i>	0.001	0.049	0.005

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Ln relative government representation	10* (10)	17** (18)	19** (21)
Ln relative government representation sq.	0.18*** (0.083)	0.15*** (0.074)	0.15*** (0.078)
Inequality (Literacy)		1.2 (0.82)	
Relative underdevelopment			0.11* (0.12)
Relative development			0.072* (0.095)
Oil region		2.8+ (1.7)	3.4* (2.0)
Mining region		2.7+ (1.4)	2.2 (1.2)
Ln group's government representation	0.80 (0.38)	0.86 (0.39)	0.93 (0.43)
Statehood	12*** (8.3)	15*** (9.7)	19*** (13)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	12 (26)	8.6 (17)	7.1 (13)
Ln distance	4.9*** (2.3)	2.0 (0.95)	2.0 (0.94)
Ln group population ('000s)	1.5* (0.32)	1.3 (0.31)	1.2 (0.30)
Ln country GDP per capita	0.025+ (0.048)	0.028+ (0.058)	0.023+ (0.052)
Ln country population ('000s)	630+ (2100)	1000+ (3700)	2000+ (7800)
Peace year splines	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1588	1588	1588
Ln likelihood	-62	-61	-60

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by ethnic group

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Periphery vs periphery model	Center vs periphery models		
Ln relative government representation	1.3 (0.20)			
Ln relative government representation sq.	0.49*** (0.066)			
Inequality (Literacy)		0.079*** (0.049)		
Relative underdevelopment			27*** (16)	
Relative development			4.1+ (3.1)	
Oil region				3.0*** (0.57)
Mining region				0.71+ (0.14)
Observations	2451	2451	2451	2451
Ln likelihood	-494	-518	-508	-513
Vuong statistic		3.20	1.97	2.80
<i>p-value</i>		0.001	0.049	0.005

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


	Model ???1	Model ???2	Model ???3	Model ???4
Ln relative government representation	8.4 ⁺ (9.6)	11* (12)	8.5 ⁺ (11)	8.8 ⁺ (11)
Ln relative government representation sq.	0.22** (0.12)	0.17** (0.096)	0.23* (0.15)	0.21* (0.13)
Ln group's government representation	1.0 (0.61)	1.1 (0.65)	1.00 (0.66)	1.0 (0.60)
Statehood	11** (9.3)	14** (12)	20*** (17)	12** (11)
Difference group pop. shares sq.	13 (31)	16 (38)	11 (26)	13 (32)
Ln distance	4.8** (2.3)	3.5* (1.9)	4.5* (2.7)	5.4*** (2.3)
Ln group population ('000s)	1.2 (0.32)	1.3 (0.35)	1.3 (0.34)	1.3 (0.36)
Ln country GDP per capita	2.7 (5.3)	1.1 (2.1)	6.0 (14)	1.9 (3.7)
Ln country population ('000s)	16000** (53000)	32000** (110000)	950 ⁺ (3700)	19000** (61000)
No. potential separatists	2.0*** (0.19)	2.0*** (0.16)	1.9*** (0.16)	2.0*** (0.17)
Crossborder coethnics in power		0.28** (0.13)		
Crossborder coethnic rebellion			11 (19)	
Rival migrant				1.0 (0.63)
Peace year splines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1384	1588	1588	1588
Ln likelihood	-56	-56	-55	-57

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors clustered by ethnic group

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure: Predicted probability of separatist war by Indian border-region ethnic group as a function of relative government representation (Based on Table ??, Model ??1, plotted with 90% confidence intervals)



Ethnic group	Years of insurgency
Nagas	1956–68 1992–1997 2000 2005–07
Mizos	1966–68
Tripuri	1979–1988 1992–93 1995 1997–04 2006
Meitei	1982–88 1992–2000 2003–2009
Gurumukhti Punjabi	1983–93
Kashmiri	1989–2010
Bodo	1989–90 1993–2004 2009–2010
Assamese	1990–91 1994–2010
Kukis	1997
Dimasa	2008

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Separatist insurgency	0.056	0.23	0	1
Ln relative government representation	0.15	1.3	-3.0	3.4
Inequality (Literacy)	0.19	0.28	3.8 e-8	3.4
Relative underdevelopment	0.63	0.28	0	1.00
Relative development	0.096	0.27	0	1.00
Oil region	0.44	0.50	0	1
Mining region	0.33	0.47	0	1
Ln group's government representation	-0.054	1.8	-4.6	3.7
Statehood	0.22	0.41	0	1
Difference group pop. shares sq.	0.40	0.23	0.0045	0.90
Ln distance	6.8	0.68	4.8	7.5
Ln group population ('000s)	6.9	2.2	1.9	11
Ln country GDP per capita	0.100	0.45	-0.52	1.2
Ln country population ('000s)	11	0.31	10	11
Peace years	26	18	0	62
Observations	2451			

	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
No. potential separatists	37	4.7	29	43
Crossborder coethnics	0.85	0.35	0	1
Crossborder coethnics in power	0.22	0.41	0	1
Crossborder coethnic rebellion	0.017	0.13	0	1
Rival migrant	0.12	0.33	0	1
<i>Observations</i>	2451			